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REVIEWS
Nor do codes of fair procedures promise easier solutions. Most of these
codes deal with such matters as the right to counsel or the right of reply; few
concern themselves with the proper scope of legislative inquiries.0 But one
provision embodied in some of these codes-namely, the requirement that
legislative investigations be subjected to continuing scrutiny by a special super-
visory congressional committee-is, as Mr. Barth points out, "an indispensable
means of keeping committees responsible and of discharging the responsibility
of the House and Senate for their conduct" : particularly if these supervisory
committees are empowered to receive and investigate complaints from the
general public.8
But no such codes will be enacted until a public morality is created that
makes congressional abuses politically unprofitable. Gozernent by Investi-
gation will aid greatly in generating that morality.
WILL MIASLOWf
THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN, A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL Dy NAMtics.
By E. Adamson Hoebel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp.
viii, 357. $5.50.
PRIMITIVE law as a subject partakes of both legal science and social anthro-
pology. While te-tbooks of anthropology have been appearing during the last
ten or fifteen years at the rate of three or four a year, comprehensive publications
on primitive law appear but seldom. This is probably due mainly to tie fact
that a two-fold professional qualification is required for the study of primitive
law. Only a jurist with training in cultural anthropology or ethnology, or con-
versely, an anthropologist with additional training in legal theory and historical
jurisprudence is truly competent for a discourse on primitive law. A happy
solution to the problem of equipment and competence is the association of two
co-authors, one with legal, the other with anthropological training. In their
volume The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Casc Law in Primitive Jurispru-
dence, published in 1941, E. Adamson Hoebel in collaboration with K. N.
Llewellyn presented us with a work that is probably the best monograph ever
6. See Maslow, Fair Procedure In Congressional Investigations: A Proposed Code,
54 CoL m. L. REv. 839, 850-61 (1954). The Doyle Resolution, H.R. Ras. 151, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess., adopted by the House of Representatives on March 23, 1955, is a mere sop to the
advocates of reform. Its only advance is the provision requiring committees to hear first
in executive session matters that may defame a person, and entitling such a person to ap-
pear as a witness in his own behalf.
7. P. 202.
8. For such a provision see § 8 of S. Rzs. 101, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced on
May 17, 1955 by a hi-partisan group of eighteen Senators, headed by Senator Estes
Kefauver. See also Amraamc&N BAR AssocIATIox, SPECIAL Co~mzTr= o. INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AS AFFECTED BY NATIONAL SECURITY, RIEPR ON CON.-GRESSIONAL I.vasnGATno1os
40-43 (1954).
1fDirector, Commission on Law and Social Action, American Jewish Congress.
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written on the subject. Since then, Professor Hoebel has further distinguished
himself in the sphere of legal science by the publication of half a dozen papers
on primitiire law, including his important essay on Flindamental Legal Con-
cepts as Applied in the Study of Primitive Law.' Now Professor Hoebel has
published a comprehensive volume that submits a wealth of factual material
to sociological analysis and legal evaluation.
The book is divided into three parts. The largest of these parts, and the
factual backbone of the volume, is part II, "Primitive Law-ways," which con-
sists of a series of studies of social structures and tribal laws, derived front
monographs. Two of the five chapters in this part are devoted to American
peoples, the Eskimos and the Plains Indians; one to an Asiatic people, the
Ifugao of Luzon; one to an African group, the Ashanti; and one to the
Melanesian Trobriand Islanders. These chapters are primarily descriptive,
but Professor Hoebel also supplies analysis and commentary. A number of
other primitive groups are referred to in parts I and III, but these parts are
primarily devoted to theoretical discussion. Thus part I, entitled "The Study
of Primitive Law," includes chapters on "The Cultural Background of Law,"
"What is Law ?," "Methods and Techniques," and "Fundamental Legal Con-
cepts as Applied in the Study of Primitive Law." Part III, under the heading
"Law and Society," contains three essays: "Religion, Magic and Law," "The
Functions of Law," and "The Trend of the Law." There are, of course, a
bibliography and an index.
Professor Hoebel calls his method "functional realism." 2 His attitude toward
law arises from his general methodological postulate in anthropology: "Our
primary concern, it is true, is functional: How does the law work as a whole?
Why does it work as it does? How and why do its parts work as they do in
relation to each other and to the cultural totality and the social entirety ?" This
is a paraphrase of the classic definition of functionalism coined by Malinowski,
the dogma and methodological vade mecum of the majority of students of an-
thropology in the English-speaking world from around 1925 until only a few
years ago. But recently functionalism has been tempered by a renascence of the
historical approach, and it is pleasant to find Professor Hoebel in the camp of
those scholars who not only recognize the great importance of history, but live
up to this insight in their own method of research:
"[C]ulture and society are not momentary things. They come out of
the past, exist in the present, and continue into the future. They have
historical continuity. What they are is the product of what they have
been, worked upon by presently impinging conditions and forces. ...
Thus with the law; its present nature and functions are our chief concern,
but its general history also has significance."
'4
The author analyzes the "law systems" of the cultures he examines. The
term is a sufficiently accurate and useful one, but it must be distinguished from






the very similar term "legal system" which, following Dean Wigmore, should
be resh-icted to the small number of peoples "who have developed a well-
defined, organized, continuous body of legal ideas and methods, reaching the
dignity and solidarity of a legal system."0 Not one of the primitive peoples
whose laws are discussed in part II would qualify for this category, not even
the Ashanti. Generally speaking, the study of primitive law is not concerned
with "legal systems," although it may deal with the early stages in the develop-
ment of legal systems.0
Professor Hoebel presents his own definition, not of "law," but of the ad-
jective "legal," and used as a noun, "the legal :" "A social norm is legal if
its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application
of physical force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized
privilege of so acting."7 Implicit in this definition is the general concept of
law as a complex of rules of social conduct, or norms, and of "a law" as one
of these rules or norms. But there are rules that are not law, and the author
takes the trouble of demonstrating that in particular, custom and law are not
identical: otherwise, "the patterns of pottery making, flint flaking, tooth filing,
toilet training, and all the other social habits of a people, are law." The
argument is not a sound one, for habits, usages and technical practices are
not really "customs." The term "custom" should be reserved for social be-
havior and norms of social conduct that have relevance to the public order in
the community. Law arises out of custom: there can be no doubt that in the
early stages of most of the great European legal systems, the unwritten law
grew up in the form of custom.
Professor Hoebel presents an interesting theory of how such unwritten
"primeval" law originally developed. Having initially stated that the first
essential function of law is to define relationships among the members of a
society, he suggests:
"No culture has a specific starting point in time; yet in the operation of
the first function it is as though men were getting together and saying to
each other, 'Look here! Let's have a little organization here or we'll never
get anywhere with this mess! Let's have a clear understanding of who's
who, and what we are to do, and how we are going to do it !' In its essence
it is what the social-contract theorists recognized as the foundation of
social order."9
Interesting though this theory is, the reviewer is inclined rather to George
W. Paton's view:
5. 1 VIGmOpE, A PANOMMA OF THE WoRLD's LmL. SvsTrms 4 (1928).
6. One of the best examples, in the sphere of Germanic laws, is H. Schreuer, Das
Recht der Toten, in 33 ZEITSCHmFFT FOR VmwLmcHEnE REc-TsWnssE zScAFr 333
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"It is often asked whether conviction generates practice, or practice con-
viction. If we emphasize too much the first alternative, this suggests that
the community logically faces its problems and devises self-consciously
the best rules. This is a false picture-the growth of much custom is not
the result of conscious thought but of tentative practice."1 0
In his chapter on "Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in the Study of
Primitive Law," Professor Hoebel accepts Hohfeld's fundamental premise that
all legal relations are between persons," and he quotes A. L. Corbin's formula-
tion that "there can be no such thing as a legal relation between a person and a
thing. ' 112 This theory is definitely inadequate in dealing with primitive cultures,
where the jus in ren by original acquisition (as opposed to derivative acquisi-
tion) emanates from the personality of the purchaser, maker or author. In fact,
the idea that a manufactured object is the product of the personality of the
maker is ultimately responsible for specificatio, the Roman and civil law con-
cept of acquisition of an object by means of physically transforming it. It can-
not be argued that those invisible ties between person and thing are fictitious,
since they are established by conviction and sanctioned by convention, pre-
cisely like any other legal ties-such as the rights and obligations arising
from contracts. In the life of the Australian aborigines, for example, the whole
social structure of the group is tied up with certain material objects, the ritual
boards, which are engraved with symbols of the totem and believed to be
literally identical with the ancestors of the prehistoric "dream-time."
These few criticisms will not, I hope, obscure my feeling that a wealth of stimu-
lating ideas is offered in the book, in addition to the solid material presented
in the five monographs in part II. There are some minor inaccuracies in Pro-
fessor Hoebel's book,'13 but in spite of these this work is bound to become the
textbook of primitive law for future generations of students of both social an-
thropology and jurisprudence, and as well for administrators in those parts
of the world where "primitive" peoples are still under European guidance.
LEONHARD ADAMf
10. PATON, A TEXT BooK OF JURIsPRUDENcE, 145 (2d ed. 1951).
11. P. 47.
12. P. 47.
13. The first exposition of reciprocity as the fundamental principle of many primitive
societies, in particular in Melanesia, was made not by Malinowski but by Richard
Thurnwald ten years earlier, in his Banaro Society, 3 Min. Am. ANTHRO. Ass'n 251
(1916). A few misprints: R. R. Marett is mis-spelled "R. H. Marrett" and the name
of Wolfgang K5hler (THE MENTALITY OF APES) is not "Kohler." Lastly, I should
like to be permitted to say a few words pro domo: in the bibliography, Professor Hoebel
has done me the honor of including the titles of some of my publications. The second
in the list, METHODS AND FORMnS OF INVESTIGATING AND REcORDING OF NATIVE CUSTOMARY
LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES BEFORE THE WAR is not my work but that of
my distinguished namesake, the eminent Dutch specialist in Indohesian law, L. Adam,
who always signs his initial only.
fLecturer in Anthropology in the Department of History, Curator of Ethnographical
Collection, University of Melbourne.
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